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The European Union, Canada, and the United States have each grappled with what 
counts as fair business practices in relation to information services that collect and 
package personal information that has ended up in one way or another online. On 
the open internet, this personal information often originates from two types of online 
sources: public records like arrests, mugshots, court decisions, and bankruptcy records; 
and user-generated content hosted on social media platforms and sites. This article 
argues that personal information that has been exposed to public view — be it by a 
government institution, another individual or organization, or by the data subject him 
or herself — should not be considered fair game to any and all subsequent commercial 
exploitation. The blunt concept of “public” information should be refined to a more 
nuanced understanding of “publicly accessible” information, where public access can be 
limited to particular purposes. By focusing on fairness in business dealings in publicly 
accessible personal information, it should be possible to move beyond a fixation on 
locating the elusive divide between private and public online information, and instead 
frame privacy as situated in a three-way balance of interests between the business, the 
public, and the data subject.
*  Andrea Slane, PhD, Associate Professor in Legal Studies, University of 
Ontario Institute of Technology, Oshawa, Ontario: Andrea.slane@uoit.ca. 
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I. Introduction
In the last decade, online information brokers have come under increasing scrutiny from regulators in the European Union, Canada, 
and the United States. Each jurisdiction has grappled with where to 
draw the line regarding what kind of business practices are fair in each 
regime, especially where online businesses provide an information service 
that includes the collection and packaging of the personal information 
of individuals whose information has ended up in one way or another 
online. A comparison of these efforts reveals important variations and 
policy options, but also some common ground. This article explores these 
options and the decisions jurisdictions make to restrain the otherwise 
unimpeded flow of online personal information through information 
brokers.
Finding appropriate ways to regulate the way personal information 
flows through commercial business models is necessary, because the 
choices we make have implications for general commercial fairness in 
data processing. In particular, it is important to focus on privacy in 
publicly accessible personal information, since so much personal data 
is now generated from “public” online activity. This article will focus 
on recent legal and regulatory developments in the EU, Canada, and 
the US that deal with information products and services that collect, 
process, and package publicly accessible personal information. On the 
open internet, this personal information often originates from two types 
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of online sources: public records (like arrests, mugshots, court decisions, 
and bankruptcy records) and user-generated content hosted on social 
media platforms and sites. 
Personal information that has been exposed to public view — be 
it by a government institution, another individual or organization, or 
by the data subject him or herself — should not be thought of as fair 
game to any subsequent commercial exploitation. The blunt concept of 
“public” information should be refined by shifting to a more nuanced 
understanding of “publicly accessible” information, where public access 
to that information can be limited to particular purposes. Each of 
the three jurisdictions has been engaged in determining what are fair 
purposes for accessing and subsequently exploiting personal information 
for commercial gain, albeit in their own distinct ways.
The concept of fairness permeates attempts to restrain commercial 
exploitation of publicly accessible personal information online. Fairness 
in business practices as they apply to individuals — whether they be 
customers or members of the broader public — governs the balance 
between the value we place in entrepreneurialism and the free market, the 
right of the public to the benefits provided by those business practices, 
and the rights of data subjects to be sheltered from certain types and 
magnitudes of informational harm. By focusing on fairness in business 
dealings in publicly accessible personal information, it should be possible 
to move beyond a fixation on locating the elusive divide between private 
and public online information, and instead frame privacy as situated in 
a three-way balance of interests among the business, the public, and the 
data subject.
In the US, efforts to articulate and manage the legitimate flow 
of personal information online have been spearheaded by the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), in particular its enforcement of fair credit 
reporting obligations and its intervention in unfair and deceptive 
business practices. In the EU and Canada, these efforts are rooted in 
data protection regimes that are intended to enforce fair information 
practices. This article compares how each of the three jurisdictions are 
working to determine to what extent, and how, existing consumer or 
data protection regimes should limit the commercial exploitation of 
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publicly accessible personal information about non-public figures.1 Part 
II applies the EU’s approach to the “right to be forgotten” as a starting 
point for exploring fairness in information location service provision, 
especially with regard to the Court of Justice of the European Union’s 
(“CJEU”) characterization of search engines as information brokers (or, 
in EU Data Protection Directive terms, “data controllers” that process 
personal information for commercial purposes).2 Part III discusses how 
the US and Canada have each dealt with limits on the commercial 
exploitation of access to public records. Part IV explores how these 
jurisdictions have dealt with commercial exploitation of user-generated 
content containing personal information. Part V considers the problem 
of digital public culture — that is, how to deal with material containing 
personal information that is popular online, whether as “news” or as viral 
content like a meme. In an important sense, viral content can become 
part of the fabric of digital public culture in the same way that an event 
that is “newsworthy” merits public exposure and discussion even if it 
contains personal information and invades an individual’s privacy. This 
section proposes newsworthiness as an arbiter of fairness for capitalizing 
1. The distinction between public and private figures arises in the context 
of defamation and privacy litigation, especially First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the US. For the purposes of this article, non-public 
figures are persons whose actions and activities are subject to little or 
no specific public interest. See Susan M Gilles, “Public Plaintiffs and 
Private Facts: Should the ‘Public Figure’ Doctrine Be Transplanted into 
Privacy Law?” (2005) 83:4 Nebraska Law Review 1204. The usefulness 
of this distinction has also been considered as a way to align the right 
to be forgotten with the US First Amendment. See Michael L Rustad 
& Sanna Kulevska, “Reconceptualizing The Right to Be Forgotten to 
Enable Transatlantic Data Flow” (2015) 28:2 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Technology 349 at 354.
2. Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos 
(AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (13 May, 2014), Doc C-131/12, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (CJEU) [Google Spain]; EC, Directive 95/46/
EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] 
OJ, L 281/31 [Directive 95/46/EC].  
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on popular user-generated content (though the term itself requires 
significant refinement), with the aim of allowing for digital public culture 
to flourish while still protecting privacy of data subjects. Part VI explores 
the attitude that publicly accessible information is “free for the taking”, 
and how the US and Canada have placed restrictions on businesses that 
try to unfairly capitalize on this perception.
Overall, the following analysis will demonstrate that broader 
principles of information fairness should guide choices about how to 
protect data subjects from the far more powerful forces of commercial 
enterprises that deal in personal information products and services.
II. The EU’s “Right to Be Forgotten” as a Restraint 
on Commercial Exploitation of Personal 
Information Online
The EU’s implementation of the right to be forgotten is a good starting 
point for discussing information brokers, fairness, and privacy in publicly 
accessible personal information, because this right is centrally concerned 
with whether ongoing public access to personal information that has 
already been made available online should be permitted. There are two 
major versions of the right to be forgotten, neither of which is very well 
captured by the concept of “forgetting”. The first is the right to obscurity, 
which is a narrow procedural remedy for data subjects operating within 
existing data protection obligations in the EU. The right to obscurity 
arises from the 2014 CJEU decision in Google Spain SL, Google Inc v 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja Gonzalez,3 
which determined that data subjects have a right to require general 
search engines like Google to de-list certain links that appear in search 
results of their name, based on the characterization of search engines as 
information brokers.
The second is the right to erasure, which is a broader substantive right 
to require data controllers to erase certain online personal information; 
3. Google Spain, ibid.
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this will be implemented in the EU General Data Protection Regulation4 
(“GDPR”) that comes into force in May 2018. This right to erasure applies 
to all data controllers including those that generate their own content 
(like news agencies), but when applied to secondary online information 
brokers (like search engines and hosts), it would mean ensuring that 
content does not appear in search results or otherwise on the hosting 
service, further reducing public accessibility of that information.5 This 
article focuses on secondary information brokers that compile and 
present information garnered from other sources that do not originate 
with the business itself.
Two aspects of the Google Spain decision are particularly important 
to the following discussion: (1) the characterization of what Google does 
as information brokering — that is, the creation of a packaged profile 
of an individual, and (2) the determination that Google’s activities are 
predominantly commercial rather than, for example, exercised in the 
public interest. A preliminary determination in Google Spain was based on 
whether Google and other general search engines are subject to the Data 
Protection Directive. The CJEU considered whether Google engaged in 
“processing” personal information as a “data controller” as set out in the 
Directive. The CJEU determined that it did, in that Google controls the 
algorithm that collects personal information from diverse online sources, 
4. “[R]ight to be Forgotten, also known as Data Erasure, entitles the data 
subject to have the data controller erase his/her personal data, cease 
further dissemination of the data, and potentially have third parties 
halt processing of the data. The conditions for erasure, as outlined in 
article 17, include the data no longer being relevant to original purposes 
for processing, or a data subjects withdrawing consent. It should also be 
noted that this right requires controllers to compare the subjects’ rights 
to “the public interest in the availability of the data” when considering 
such requests”. See “GDPR Key Changes” EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, online: EUGDPR <eugdpr.org/key-changes.html>.
5. For a fuller discussion of the contours of the right to be forgotten and 
how it might be implemented in Canada, see Andrea Slane, “Search 
Engines and the Right to Be Forgotten: Squaring the Remedy with 
Canadian Values on Personal Information Flow”(forthcoming 2018) 55:2 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal [Slane, “Squaring the Remedy”].
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then collates and presents it to users in a ranked form.6 When a person 
is searched by name, Google gathers available mentions across online 
sources and produces a profile that potentially has a greater impact on the 
privacy interests of the data subject than any one of those sources alone.7 
As for the commercial nature of Google’s activities, the CJEU focused 
on the most straightforward ways that Google makes money from 
searches, namely through its AdWords advertising program. AdWords 
uses a “pay per click” advertising model whereby advertisers bid for 
association with particular search terms, so that links to their sites come 
up at the top of search results, as tailored to the searcher’s geographic 
area.8 The CJEU wrote:
[t]he very display of personal data on a search results page constitutes 
processing of such data. Since that display of results is accompanied, on the 
same page, by the display of advertising linked to the search terms, it is clear 
that the processing of personal data in question is carried out in the context of 
the commercial and advertising activity of the controller’s establishment on the 
territory of a Member State, in this instance Spanish territory.9
The CJEU did not consider whether advertising appears on the same page 
of every type of search result, and whether this makes any difference to 
the overall analysis. In general, an individual’s name, even a well-known 
public figure, does not serve as an AdWords linked keyword. However, if 
the individual’s name is searched in conjunction with another term that 
is an AdWords keyword, then advertising links will appear. For example, 
if the complainant in the Google Spain case is searched in conjunction 
with the term “bankruptcy” (his complaint aimed to have Google de-list 
6. Google Spain, supra note 2 at paras 32–33.
7. Ibid at para 37.
8. Rory Cellan-Jones, “How does Google make money?” BBC News, online: 
BBC iWonder <bbc.co.uk/guides/z9x6bk7>; Greg McFarlane, “How 
Does Google Make Its Money?” Investopedia (22 November 2012), 
online: Investopedia <investopedia.com/stock-analysis/2012/what-does-
google-actually-make-money-from-goog1121.aspx>; Julia Love & Rishika 
Sadam, “Google parent Alphabet’s profit up 29 percent on strong ad sales” 
Reuters (27 April 2017), online: Reuters <in.reuters.com/article/alphabet-
results/google-parent-alphabets-profit-up-29-percent-on-strong-ad-sales-
idINKBN17T2ZQ>.
9. Google Spain, supra note 2 at para 57.
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links to public notices about past debt), then ads for debt relief services 
will appear at the top of the page.10
Nonetheless, having determined that Google is a “data controller” that 
“processes” personal information within an overall commercial business 
model that monetizes search results, the search engine is required, upon 
request, to remove links from the search results of a person’s name where 
those links lead to information that is “inadequate, irrelevant, no longer 
relevant or excessive” to the purpose for which it was collected, unless 
there is a public interest in retaining the link to that information upon 
such a name search.11
For the most part, implementation of the Google Spain decision 
appears to be predominantly focused on results containing outdated 
personal information of non-public figures, where the privacy interests 
of the data subject outweigh the interests of the public in having access 
to that specific information through a search of that individual’s name 
(such as a link revealing a long ago conviction for a minor crime).12 It 
remains unclear whether the idea of “excessive to the purpose” could be 
meaningfully applied to a general search engine; if we characterize search 
engines’ purpose for collection as providing a ranked compilation of most 
relevant publicly accessible online information related to that person, 
then “excessive” is a bit more refined than relevance alone. A search 
result could also be “excessive” if it returned highly sensitive information. 
Relevance and excessiveness must in any case be considered normative 
10. “How Does Google Make Its Money: The 20 Most Expensive Keywords 
in Google AdWords” Wordstream, online: Wordstream <wordstream.
com/articles/most-expensive-keywords>. This article used data from 
2010–2011 and concluded that the most expensive pay per click word is 
“insurance” followed by “loans” and “mortgage”. 
11. The terms “inadequate, irrelevant, no longer relevant or excessive” come 
from the EU Data Protection Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 
2, which requires at art 6(1)(c) that personal data must be “adequate, 
relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed”. 
12. “Transparency Report: Search removals under European privacy law” 
Google, online: Google <transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/
overview> [Google Transparency Report].
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terms, akin to “newsworthiness”, which is similarly not dependent on 
the judgement of a particular individual reader, but rather defines the 
contours of legitimate public interest in having the information.13 
Relevance and excessiveness relate to newsworthiness, in that 
relevance implies a public interest in access to this information that 
outweighs the data subject’s privacy interests, an interest that is calculated 
via the sensitivity of the information at issue. Along these lines, data 
protection regimes typically exclude the practice of “journalism” from 
data protection obligations.14 Therefore, the collection of personal 
information about the subject of a news item legitimately in the public’s 
interest, even when carried out by a for-profit news organization, is not 
constrained by obligations that would restrict public access to that news 
item.15 In passing, the CJEU rejected the possibility that what search 
engines do is journalism.16 The Advocate General’s opinion on the case 
offered some credence to the idea that search engines serve as archives, 
but reiterated European jurisprudence that has held that news archives 
13. Newsworthiness is most often used in the US context in relation to 
defamation, right of publicity and publication of private facts cases. It 
has often been criticized by US scholars who consider it to permit too 
much encroachment on freedom of expression. See e.g. Amy Gajda, The 
First Amendment Bubble: How Privacy and Paparazzi Threaten a Free Press 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Amy Gajda, “The Present 
of Newsworthiness” (2016) 50:2 New England Law Review 145. Others 
consider newsworthiness to provide too easy a justification for violating 
privacy. See Dianna M Worley, “Shulman v Group W Productions: Invasion 
of Privacy by Publication of Private Facts — Where Does California Draw 
the Line Between Newsworthy Information and Morbid Curiosity?” 
(2000) 27 Western State University Law Review 535 at 535. 
14. In Canada, see Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents 
Act, SC 2000, c 5, s 7(1)(c) [PIPEDA]. See also Teresa Scassa, “Journalistic 
Purposes and Private Sector Data Protection Legislation: Blogs, Tweets 
and Information Maps” (2010) 35:2 Queen’s Law Journal 733.
15. For analysis of problems with determining where to draw the line 
regarding journalism versus commercial speech that can be more heavily 
regulated, see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, “Who Put the Right in 
the Right of Publicity?” (1998) 9:1 DePaul-LCA Journal of Art and 
Entertainment Law and Policy 35 at 55.
16. Google Spain, supra note 2 at para 85.
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have a greater duty to ensure accuracy of historical information, since the 
urgency of publishing current affairs is absent.17 Alternatively, Google 
tried to claim that it cannot be a data controller because it does not 
distinguish between different types of data and does not alter that data 
in presenting results.18 The CJEU rejected this argument, stating that it 
makes no difference that Google does not distinguish between personal 
data and other information, nor does it matter that “[t]hose data have 
already been published on the internet and are not altered by the search 
engine”.19 
Several scholars have strongly critiqued Google’s assertion that its 
service merely delivers up informational history, and so serves as a form 
of cultural memory.20 For example, Julia Powles noted that many online 
service providers have been capitalizing on the concept of the internet 
as a public sphere when really it is “[j]ust an algebraic representation of 
privately owned services”.21 She warned against equating this privately 
owned and manipulated network with our commitment to maintaining 
public records and archives offline (or even digitally stored, but subject 
to some access controls). In effect, Google is trying to have it both ways: 
to be legally recognized as the guardian of transparency in the online 
info-world, and yet, to conceal the algorithm by which such information 
17. See Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja González (25 June, 2013), Doc 
C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424 at para 123.  
18. Google Spain, supra note 2 at para 22.
19. Ibid at paras 28–29.
20. For Google’s position, see Richard S Whitt, “‘Through a Glass, Darkly’: 
Technical, Policy, and Financial Actions to Avert the Coming Digital 
Dark Ages” (2017) 33:2 Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal 117.
21. Julia Powles, “The Case That Won’t Be Forgotten” (2015) 47:2 Loy 
University of Chicago Law Journal 583 at 591.
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is retrieved and monetized.22 Google claims to use more than 200 factors 
when compiling its ranking of search results, with popularity being 
a dominant factor. But even this one factor, as Powles notes, tends to 
exacerbate the “man bites dog” problem long recognized in journalism 
— that what is most popular and sells the most “papers” is not necessarily 
what is most current, accurate, or most central to overall historical records 
regarding an individual.23 
The dominance of the popularity factor is further skewed by the 
demographics of the audience that most actively uses Google — which 
has historically been Western, white, middle-class men, although this 
is slowly changing.24 The legacy of this bias is evident in studies that 
have revealed that Google searches are often skewed to favour privileged 
perspectives — delivering search results that positively reflect whites 
and negatively reflect African-Americans for instance (e.g. “beautiful 
dreadlocks” turns up images of white people while “unprofessional 
22. Richard Curtis, “Google Wants It — and Has It — Both Ways” 
Publishing in the 21st Century (blog) (30 May 2012), online: Publishing in 
the 21st Century <curtisagency.com/blog/2012/05/google-wants-it-and-
has-it-both-ways.html >; Uta Kohl, “Google: The Rise and Rise of Online 
Intermediaries in the Governance of the Internet and Beyond (Part 2)” 
(2013) 21:2 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
187 at 191–98.
23. Powles, supra note 21 at 610.
24. Bias in machine learning is common, because machines learn from 
humans and unfortunately humans are biased, especially online. See 
e.g. Aylin Caliskan, Joanna J Bryson & Arvind Narayanan, “Semantics 
derived automatically from language corpora contain human-like biases” 
(2017) 356:6334 Science, online: Science <science.sciencemag.org/
content/356/6334/183.full>; Tolga Bolukbasi et al, “Man is to Computer 
Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker? Debiasing Word Embeddings” 
(2016) arXiv 1607.06520v11, online: Cornell University Library <arxiv.
org/pdf/1607.06520.pdf>. 
12 
 
Slane, Information Brokers, Fairness and Privacy in Publicly Accessible Information
hairstyles” brings up images of black people).25 As Safiya Umoja Noble 
wrote: 
[i]t is dominant narratives about the objectivity and popularity of web search 
results that make misogynist or racist search results appear to be natural. Not 
only do they seem [“normal”] due to the technological blind spots of users 
who are unable to see the commercial interests operating in the background 
of search (deliberately obfuscated from their view), they also seem completely 
unavoidable because of the perceived [“popularity”] of sites as the factor that 
lifts websites to the top of the [results] pile.26
Further, Google has been called to task regarding how its AdWord 
algorithms work. One study found that searches of names associated with 
African-Americans were more likely to include ads for criminal record 
checks than neutral names or names associated with white people.27 In 
other words, Google’s business model delivers results and advertising 
skewed by existing social bias.
Google is constantly adjusting its algorithms and regularly attempts 
to address some of these concerns, but doing so merely reinforces the 
CJEU conclusion that Google indeed controls data collection, packaging, 
and presentation; Google search results are not neutral reflections of the 
material that is publicly available on the internet. Therefore, in terms 
of data protection and consumer protection, skewed results containing 
personal information should be addressed by requirements related to 
25. Fiona Rutherford & Alan White, “This Is Why Some People Think 
Google’s Results Are ‘Racist’” BuzzFeed (12 April 2016), online: BuzzFeed 
<www.buzzfeed.com/fionarutherford/heres-why-some-people-think-
googles-results-are-racist?utm_term=.kqpDg0ERB7#.dpKoZBwvqA>; 
Leigh Alexander, “Do Google’s ‘unprofessional hair’ results show it is 
racist?” The Guardian (8 April 2016), online: The Guardian <theguardian.
com/technology/2016/apr/08/does-google-unprofessional-hair-results-
prove-algorithms-racist->.
26. Safiya Umoja Noble, “Google Search: Hyper-visibility as a Means of 
Rendering Black Women and Girls Invisible”, (2013) 19 InVisible 
Culture, online: University of Rochester <ivc.lib.rochester.edu/google-
search-hyper-visibility-as-a-means-of-rendering-black-women-and-girls-
invisible/>. 
27. Latanya Sweeney, “Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery” (2013) 
arXiv: 1301.6822 1, online: Cornell University Library <arxiv.org/
pdf/1301.6822.pdf>.  
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relevance and excessiveness, more fairly balancing the interests of data 
subjects with the interests of searchers to easily find that information.
III. Using Fairness to Restrict Businesses that 
Facilitate Access to Public Documents Through 
Information Compilation Products
Since the advent of the internet, the easy accessibility of personal 
information has raised concerns about its use by the various gatekeepers 
of financial and professional opportunities — especially insurers, 
lenders, admissions officers, and potential employers.28 Scholars and 
commentators have debated the best ways to address unfairness that 
can result from misuse of information found online — from legislation 
addressing the provision of the information, to legal restrictions on use, 
to ethical guidelines for these industries.29 Parallel debates have focused 
on digitizing and facilitating public access to public documents, such as 
28. “Number of Employers Using Social Media to Screen 
Candidates Has Increased 500 Percent over the Last Decade” 
CareerBuilder (28 April 2016), online: CareerBuilder 
<careerbuilder.ca/share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.
aspx?sd=4%2F28%2F2016&id=pr945&ed=12%2F31%2F2016>; 
Jonathan A Segal & Joyce LeMay, “POINT/COUNTERPOINT: Should 
Employers Use Social Media to Screen Job Applicants?” HR Magazine 
(1 November 2014), online: SHRM <www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/
hr-magazine/pages/1114-social-media-screening.aspx>; Kaitlin Mulhere, 
“Lots More College Admissions Officers Are Checking Your Instagram 
and Facebook” Money (13 January 2016), online: Time <time.com/
money/collection-post/4179392/college-applications-social-media/>; 
Stephanie Armour, “Borrowers Hit Social-Media Hurdles: Regulators 
Have Concerns About Lenders’ Use of Facebook, Other Sites” The Wall 
Street Journal (8 January 2014), online: Wall Street Journal <www.wsj.
com/articles/borrowers-hit-socialmedia-hurdles-1389224469>.
29. Avner Levin, “Losing the Battle but Winning the War: Why Online 
Information Should Be a Prohibited Ground” (2015) 18:2 Canadian 
Labour and Employment Law Journal 379; Nathan J Ebnet, “It Can Do 
More Than Protect Your Credit Score: Regulating Social Media Pre-
Employment Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act” (2012–2013) 
97:1 Minnesota Law Review 306.
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court decisions and documents, or arrest and detention records.30
If Google qualifies as a “data controller” for the purposes of the 
EU Data Protection Directive, then surely other online businesses that 
specifically provide a compilation of material about an individual found 
in public records would also qualify. In the US, restrictions on such 
businesses are relatively limited, but the FTC has initiated investigations 
and issued rulings against some of these businesses, including under the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act31 (“FCRA”). The text of the Act is promising in 
that it defines a “consumer report” as communication of any information 
by a consumer reporting agency: 
[b]earing on a consumer’s credit worthiness … character, general reputation, 
personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be 
used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor 
in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for (A) credit or [personal, family or 
household] insurance … (B) employment.32
The FCRA also sets out restrictions on specific information that should 
not be provided as part of a consumer credit report, including outdated 
financial information (generally after 7 years), bankruptcies after 10 years, 
arrest records (generally after 7 years), and “[a]ny other adverse item of 
information, other than records of conviction of crimes” (generally after 
7 years).33 These time limits are related in spirit to the EU’s restriction on 
data controllers dealing in outdated and no longer relevant information, 
30. Amanda Conley et al, “Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the 
Transition to Online Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry” 
(2011–2012) 71:3 Maryland Law Review 772; Karen Eltis, “The Judicial 
System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between Privacy 
and Accessibility in the Cyber Context” (2011) 56:2 McGill Law Journal 
289.
31. In Canada, consumer reporting agencies are regulated by provincial 
legislation and require registration with a provincial authority. For 
instance, in Ontario, such agencies are governed by the Consumer 
Reporting Act, RSO 1990, c C-33. However, all businesses are subject 
to some form of data protection obligations, either the federal PIPEDA 
or substantially similar provincial legislation; for US, see Fair Credit 
Reporting Act, 15 USC § 1681a (1970) [FCRA].
32. FCRA, ibid, § 1681a(d)(1).
33. Ibid, § 1681c(a).
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but the EU’s definition of “data controller” is vastly broader than the 
FCRA’s definition of “consumer reporting agency”.
The definition of a “consumer reporting agency” under the FCRA 
encompasses any person or organization that: 
[f ]or monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages 
in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit 
information or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports to third parties.34 
This definition is narrowed by the fact that “for the purpose of furnishing 
consumer reports” incorporates the definition of “consumer reports” as 
restricted to situations where the information collected is being provided 
“for the purpose of serving as a factor” in establishing creditworthiness or 
for employment purposes. The FCRA does not capture more general or 
unspecified purposes for collecting consumer information. 
The consequences of this limitation are evident in the FTC’s complaint 
brought forward by the US Attorney General against Spokeo in 2012.35 
Spokeo is an online service that assembles consumer information from 
online and offline sources to create “consumer profiles” to which it sells 
access to individuals or businesses. At the time of the complaint, Spokeo 
marketed its service specifically to the human resources industry as a 
background screening tool, offering high-volume access via subscription. 
After the court ruling against Spokeo for violating the FCRA, the end 
result has been that Spokeo no longer specifically markets its service to the 
human resources industry, but otherwise continues to operate its business 
in the same fashion, including by offering high-volume subscriptions.36
Since the Spokeo ruling, other personal information compilation 
services have also merely posted disclaimers that their services should 
not be used for FCRA-covered purposes. Truthfinder.com, for instance, 
34. Ibid, § 1681a(f ). 
35. US, Federal Trade Commission, United States v Spokeo Inc (CV12-05001) 
(2012). 
36. Spokeo instead claims that high volume subscriptions “generally appeal to 
professionals whose work routine includes constant people research”. See 
“FAQs: what are quota upgrades?” Spokeo, online: Spokeo <www.spokeo.
com/faqs-consumer>.
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requires users to click an “I understand” button to enter the site, affirming 
consent to the statement that: 
TruthFinder does not provide consumer reports and is not a consumer 
reporting agency. We provide a lot of sensitive information that can be used to 
satisfy your curiosity, protect your family, and find the truth about the people 
in your life. You may not use our service or the information it provides to make 
decisions about consumer credit, employers, insurance, tenant screening, or 
any other purposes that would require [FCRA] compliance.37 
Instead, Truthfinder’s marketing is primarily aimed at individuals who 
want to learn “the truth about the history of your family and friends”, 
although the service offers “Power Users” a discount for purchasing three 
months of unlimited searching.38 Another FCRA disclaimer appears in 
tiny print at the bottom of the welcome page, stating: 
[t]he information available on our website may not be 100% accurate, 
complete, or up to date, so do not use it as a substitute for your own due 
diligence, especially if you have concerns about a person’s criminal history. 
TruthFinder does not make any representation or warranty about the accuracy 
of the information available through our website or about the character or 
integrity of the person about whom you inquire.39 
Truthfinder thus does not take any responsibility for the accuracy of its 
contents, despite what is implied in its name and marketing.
A very similar FCRA disclaimer appears on commercial mugshot and 
arrest record websites, which offer a way to acquire a compilation of this 
subset of public records, generally scraped from law enforcement and 
detention centre websites that make such information available online to 
the public.40 Debates about the value and purpose of making these sorts of 
pre-conviction and non-conviction documents a matter of public record 
have included the public interest argument that publicly inspectable 
records help ensure the transparency and fairness of the criminal justice 
system.41 However, making such records easy to acquire feeds more into 
37. Truthfinder, online: Truthfinder <www.truthfinder.com>.  
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. See e.g. Mugshots, online: Mugshots <www.mugshots.com> [Mugshots]. 
41. Danielle Bruno, “Note: Mugshots Or Public Interest? Why FOIA 
Exemption 7(C) Does Not Categorically Exempt Booking Photographs 
from Disclosure” (2016) 78 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 95.
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the socially punitive approach to persons in conflict with the law. From 
this perspective, easy-to-access mugshots and arrest records not only allow 
people to protect themselves from these individuals, but also heighten 
the effects of conflict with the law through public shaming, even when an 
individual has not been convicted of a crime. Some US states and counties 
have made arrest and detention records publicly available online, while 
others are more restrictive in their release of this information.42 Publicly 
available law enforcement and jail websites generally include disclaimers 
warning that errors and inaccuracies in the information provided are 
common, and reiterating the basic criminal justice tenet of innocence 
until proven guilty.43 EU and Canadian law enforcement organizations 
generally do not make such information freely available online.44
Commercial mugshot and arrest record websites feature similar 
disclaimers to law enforcement and jail sites.45 However, commercial sites 
tend to retain mugshot, arrest, and detention records indefinitely, still 
42. Martin A Holland, “Note: Identity, Privacy and Crime: Privacy and 
Public Records in Florida” (2012) 23 University of Florida Journal of Law 
& Public Policy 235.
43. For instance, see “Johnson County Iowa Jail Roster Disclaimer” Johnson 
County Iowa, online: Johnson County Iowa <www.johnson-county.com/
Sheriff/JailRoster/Index> [Johnson County Iowa]. 
44. In Canada, public disclosure of personal information by the government 
without the individual’s consent is generally prohibited by Privacy Act, 
RSC 1985, c P-21, s 8.
45. Mugshots.com prominently displays such a disclaimer, including (in ALL 
CAPS) that “[T]HE MUGSHOTS AND/OR ARREST RECORDS 
PUBLISHED ON MUGSHOTS.COM ARE IN NO WAY AN 
INDICATION OF GUILT AND THEY ARE NOT EVIDENCE 
THAT AN ACTUAL CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED. ARREST 
DOES NOT IMPLY GUILT, AND CRIMINAL CHARGES ARE 
MERELY ACCUSATIONS. A DEFENDANT IS PRESUMED 
INNOCENT UNLESS PROVEN GUILTY AND CONVICTED. FOR 
LATEST CASE STATUS, CONTACT THE OFFICIAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WHICH ORIGINALLY RELEASED 
THE INFORMATION”. See Mugshots, supra note 40. 
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without updating or correcting incorrect information.46 For example, 
Mugshots.com, the most prominent of these sites, calls itself a “Google 
for Mugshots”, states the following: 
[t]he website is a search engine for Official Law Enforcement records, specifically 
booking photographs, mugshots. Originally collected and distributed by Law 
Enforcement agencies, booking records are considered and legally recognized 
as public records, in the public domain. Mugshots.com republishes these 
Official Records in their original form (“as is”) under the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, the freedom to publish true and factual 
information. Our intent is to provide a legitimate and useful service for both 
the private and public sectors.47 
The site recognizes no irony in the disconnect between characterizing 
the First Amendment as guaranteeing “the freedom to publish true 
and factual information” and a disclaimer denying responsibility for 
accuracy. In response to the questions “[m]y record was expunged”; “[I] 
was pardoned”; “[m]y case was dismissed”; and “[w]ill you remove my 
mugshot?”, the Mugshots.com FAQ page states, “[a]s you may be aware 
[e]xpungement and pardon only apply to certain government agencies’ 
databases, and not all of them. Certainly not to the private sector”.48 In 
other words, according to Mugshots.com, whatever balancing the public 
sector engages in to justify granting a pardon or expungement does not 
apply to public records that are archived by private entities.
Sites like Mugshots.com capitalize on US First Amendment 
jurisprudence, which permits further dissemination of truthful 
46. The duration which arrest records are kept by public offices in US 
states varies. The Hillsborough County Florida Sheriff’s Office posts the 
following notice: “Arrest information is a Public Record under Florida 
State Law unless it has been ordered sealed or expunged. Online arrest 
inquiries are available for adult arrests occurring since January 1, 1995 for 
which the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office has an electronic record”. 
See “Arrest Inquiry” Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, online: HCSO 
<webapps.hcso.tampa.fl.us/ArrestInquiry#>. The Johnson County Iowa 
Jail Roster only contains names of individuals who are or have been held 
by the Johnson County Sheriff within the last 48 hours. See Johnson 
County Iowa, supra note 43. 
47. “About” Mugshots, online: Mugshots <mugshots.com/about.html>.
48. “FAQ” Mugshots, online: Mugshots <mugshots.com/faq.html>. 
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information if it was released by its original custodian, even if the release 
itself was against the law or public policy.49 Thus, even if the original 
source cannot vouch for the accuracy of the information, mugshot 
websites in the US are currently under no obligation to update inaccurate 
or outdated information, even in the face of a direct complaint. However, 
even in the US, commercial mugshot and arrest record websites have 
come under fire for using a business model whereby individuals can pay 
a fee to have their profile removed, altered, or updated, prompting some 
US states to enact legislation that prohibits the use of public records in 
this sort of business model, especially where the person has not been 
convicted.50 Most states do not prohibit it, so Mugshots.com, until at 
least September 2017, continued to offer “content removal services” 
through UnpublishArrest.com, which it bills as its exclusive “licensee” 
to specifically handle removal and editing requests to Mugshots.com. In 
May 2018, the state of California charged four proprietors of Mugshots.
com with extortion, money laundering, and identity theft in relation to 
this fee-for-removal scheme, and as of this writing the site now simply 
refuses to remove content at all, standing on the claim to be entitled to 
49. Florida Star v BJF, 491 US 524 (1989) [Florida Star].
50. “Mug Shots and Booking Photo Websites” National Conference of State 
Legislatures (23 October 2017), online: NCSL <ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/mug-shots-and-
booking-photo-websites.aspx>; Bruno, supra note 41; Sean P Sullivan, 
“Mugshot ‘extortion’ website ban signed by Christie” NJ.com (23 July 
2017), online: NJ.com <nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2017/07/christie_signs_
bill_banning_mugshot_extortion.html>; David Harris, “New law forces 
websites to pull mug shots of the acquitted” Orlando Sentinel (19 June 
2017), online: Orlando Sentinel <orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-
news/os-public-records-mugshots-florida-20170619-story.html>. 
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republish information issued by law enforcement agencies “as is”.51
In addition to the fee structure, the overarching business model 
for a site like Mugshots.com is advertising driven. The dynamics of the 
ads it runs capitalize on both sides of the online personal information 
market. On one hand, there are prominent ads for Cleansearch.net, 
which offers to remove results from general search engines and so targets 
data subjects. On the other hand, there are ads to fee-charging profile 
compilation services — mostly via search boxes that look like they are 
merely additional internal search engines to Mugshots.com, but actually 
bring the searcher to an external site — and so target data seekers. Links 
lead searchers to BeenVerified.com (which often uses the slogan “This 
Site’s Deep Search Can Reveal More Than Google”), Peoplelooker.
com, Instantcheckmate.com, and Truthfinder.com — all of which offer 
personal information profile compilation for a fee, either per report or as 
a monthly subscription.52 Mugshots.com also employs Google AdSense, 
which delivers sidebar ads tailored to the search history of individual 
users, regardless of the content of the website.
In 2013, in response to criticism of the business practices of 
commercial mugshot websites like Mugshots.com, Google implemented 
a voluntary change to its algorithm to demote name search results linking 
to such sites; they are not de-listed entirely, but appear lower on the 
51. Until the scheme was dismantled in late 2017, mugshots.com charged 
USD$399 to remove, permanently publish, or edit one arrest record. 
See e.g. Internet Archive: Wayback Machine (27 September 2017), 
online: Internet Archive: Wayback Machine <https://web.archive.org/
web/20170927005616/http://unpublisharrest.com/>; Internet Archive: 
Wayback Machine (3 November 2017), online: Internet Archive: Wayback 
Machine <https://web.archive.org/web/20171103230426/https://
chase44.wufoo.com/forms/zr7v2lm1svib3r/>; Cyrus Farivar, “All of 
Mugshots.com’s alleged co-owners arrested on extortion charges” Ars 
Technica (17 May 2018), online: Ars Technica <https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2018/05/all-of-mugshots-coms-alleged-co-owners-arrested-
on-extortion-charges>; “FAQ” Mugshots, supra note 48.
52. One-month subscriptions tend to hover just under USD $30. See for 
instance Truthfinder, online: Truthfinder <https://www.truthfinder.help/
cost/>.
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results list.53 Searchers are free to choose to go directly to the site and 
partake in the service and its economy directly, but Google has chosen 
to make it more difficult for a searcher who is not specifically looking for 
this sort of information to inadvertently find it. The fix is not foolproof 
however. For example, using Google to search the uniquely spelled name 
of a woman whose image is posted on the non-consensual pornography 
website MyEx.com, along with her state of residence, produces a results 
list prominently containing links to multiple sites detailing her arrest 
record, including both law enforcement institutions and Mugshots.com. 
Further, as noted above, if a person’s name is entered followed by the 
search term “arrest”, not only are these sites likely to rise to the top, but 
the results will include paid AdWords links to commercial public records 
compilation services like Truthfinder.com.
The public policy commitments related to public access to pre-
conviction and non-conviction information, as well as criminal 
conviction records, vary significantly by jurisdiction, in ways that 
profoundly shape this market for sensitive personal information.54 Many 
scholars have noted the influence of a longer tradition of personality 
rights protection in continental Europe, which is widely considered to 
be the backdrop for the current embrace of “the right to be forgotten”. 
Apart from not providing public access to past criminal conviction 
records, some European countries even forbid public discussion of past 
criminal convictions by media organizations, including documentary 
filmmakers attempting to explore historical crimes.55 In Canada, criminal 
convictions, pre-conviction status, and non-conviction records are not 
53. Barry Schwartz, “Google Launches Fix to Stop Mugshot Sites from 
Ranking: Google’s MugShot Algorithm” Search Engine Land (7 October 
2013), online: Search Engine Land <searchengineland.com/google-
launches-fix-to-stop-mugshot-sites-from-ranking-googles-mugshot-
algorithm-173672>.
54. James B Jacobs, The Eternal Criminal Record (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).
55. See discussion of European approach in Franz Werro, “The Right to 
Inform v the Right to Be Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash” in Aurelia 
Colombi Ciacchi et al, eds, Liability in the Third Millennium (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2009) 285 at 290.
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freely open to the public; they are housed in a law enforcement database 
— Canadian Police Information Centre (“CPIC”) — and are only made 
available upon legitimate request, usually with the consent of the data 
subject (for instance, when a person wants to volunteer in a school). The 
rationale for these restrictions is based on the principle that such personal 
information is always sensitive, that ongoing public disclosure is highly 
likely to negatively affect the individual, and that the inability to shield 
this information from ongoing public disclosure damages the individual’s 
chances of rehabilitation and reintegration.56 
Further, Canada makes “record suspensions” available to eligible 
individuals who apply for them, similar to European jurisdictions, 
although unlike some European countries, Canada does not prevent 
the reporting or republishing of information about past crimes. A 
record suspension (formerly referred to as a pardon) removes a criminal 
conviction record from the parts of the CPIC database that are available 
to the public upon legitimate request.57 Access to the full record is 
56. Jeannie Stiglic, “Hard to check criminal records of others: Only legal 
way is through court documents” CBC News (13 January 2012), 
online: CBC <cbc.ca/news/canada/hard-to-check-criminal-records-of-
others-1.1145038>. This is not to say that injustices do not continue to 
be perpetuated against people who have been in conflict with the law, 
since many potential employers require police record checks without 
much justification other than prejudice. See Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, “False Promises, Hidden Costs: The Case for Reframing 
Employment and Volunteer Police Record Check Practices in Canada”, 
by Abby Deshman (Toronto: CCLA, May 2014), online: CCLA <ccla.
org/recordchecks/falsepromises>. See also Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, “Presumption of Guilt? The Disclosure of Non-Conviction 
Records in Police Background Checks”, by Graeme Norton (Toronto: 
CCLA, May 2012), online: CCLA <ccla.org/cclanewsite/wp-content/
uploads/2015/02/Presumption-of-Guilt.pdf>. 
57. Convictions for which a record suspension has been granted may still 
be released pursuant to a Police Vulnerable Sector Check, which is 
sought by people seeking employment or volunteering in a position 
of authority or trust relative to vulnerable persons. For instance, 
see Ontario Provincial Police, “Criminal Record Checks and Police 
Checks” (OPP, 26 October 2017), online: OPP <opp.ca/index.
php?id=115&entryid=56a1276d8f94acdb5824a3d7>. 
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retained by police, and public accessibility according to the above noted 
restrictions can be reinstated if the individual commits another offence.58 
Overall, the US is far less generous in its protection of people with 
criminal records, and pardons are much more rare — there are some 
other administrative means of providing limited relief from the burden 
of having a criminal record, but none of them affect previous, existing, or 
future publication of the fact of conviction.59
The key issue here is ease of access versus obscurity, or put more 
materially, public accessibility to conviction records upon legitimate 
request versus accessibility by mere payment of a fee. Further, websites 
that provide public records can choose whether to allow their contents 
to be crawled and indexed by general search engines like Google. Most 
court and tribunal websites, as well as legal information repositories 
like the various Legal Information Institute sites, offer internal search 
tools but opt not to permit external search engines to index their 
content. In Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (“OPC”) 
ruled complaints against Globe24h, a website based in Romania, to be 
well-founded.60 The website had scraped content from Canadian legal 
information sites, including CanLII, and allowed the reposted court and 
tribunal documents to be searched by external search engines.61 One 
aspect of the Globe24h business model was to charge a fee to individuals 
58. For Canada, see Royal Canadian Mounted Police, “Dissemination of 
Criminal Record Information policy”, (RCMP, 24 June 2014), online: 
RCMP <rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/dissemination-criminal-record-information-
policy>.
59. Collateral Consequences Resource Center: Collateral Consequence of Criminal 
Conviction and Restoration of Rights: News, Commentary, and Tools, online: 
CCRC <ccresourcecenter.org>; Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, 
“The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral Consequence 
Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study” (2016) 35 Yale Law & Policy 
Review Inter Alia 11, online: Yale University <www.ylpr.yale.edu/sites/
default/files/IA/leasure.certificates_of_relief.produced.pdf>. 
60. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Website that generates 
revenue by republishing Canadian court decisions and allowing them to 
be indexed by search engines contravened PIPEDA, PIPEDA Report of 
Findings #2015-002 (Ottawa: OPC, 5 June 2015).  
61. Ibid.
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wishing to have their personal information removed from the site, as well 
as employing advertising. Globe24h claimed the documents were in the 
public domain and that it was free to repost the material and to make it 
more easily accessible to searchers, and refused to comply with the OPC’s 
finding.
One complainant, joined by the OPC, brought the case to the 
Federal Court, which affirmed the findings of the OPC and held that 
Globe24h was disrupting the balancing done by courts, tribunals, and 
publicly accessible legal databases like CanLII, between the open court 
principle and the privacy interests of people whose personal information 
appears in these documents.62 The Court ruled that making court 
documents searchable by general search engines does not further the 
interests of the open-court principle that justifies courts and tribunals 
making information public. Consequently, Globe24h is required to 
obtain the consent of data subjects in order to republish decisions and 
documents and make them externally searchable. The Court endorsed 
the OPC’s support of a corrective court order requiring Globe24h to 
remove Canadian cases containing personal information, to take steps to 
remove these decisions from search engine caches, and to take steps to 
ensure that any documents reposted were not indexed by search engines. 
The Court also granted a declaratory order that the complainant can then 
take to Google per its voluntary removal policy for court orders. Unlike 
the CJEU, the Canadian Court was not asked to determine whether 
general search engines like Google would be required to de-index links to 
this material coming up in a name search for a data subject.
Globe24h argued that it should qualify for either the journalistic 
purpose or the publicly available information exemptions to application 
of Canada’s private sector data protection legislation, the Personal 
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act63 (“PIPEDA”). The 
Court ruled that Globe24h was not engaging in a journalistic purpose 
when it republished court and tribunal documents and allowed them 
to be indexed by search engines, relying on the Canadian Association 
62. AT v Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114.
63. Ibid at para 29, referring to PIPEDA, supra note 14.
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of Journalists’ definition as suggested by the OPC. According to that 
definition, an activity qualifies as journalism only when: (1) its purpose 
is to inform the community on issues the community is interested in; 
(2) the presentation of the information involves an element of original 
production; and (3) it incorporates a “[s]elf-conscious discipline 
calculated to provide an accurate and fair description of facts, opinion 
and debate at play within a situation”.64 Thus, fairness once again provides 
a core measure for whether personal information is being made more 
easily publicly accessible in the public interest. The Court also rejected 
the defendant’s efforts to use the “publicly available” exemption, stating 
the exemption only applies if the defendant’s collection, use, or disclosure 
relates directly to the purpose for which the information appears in the 
public record or the original source. Again, court and tribunal records or 
documents are only exempt from further obligations if their republication 
furthers the open-court principle.65 
This ruling suggests that general search engines like Google would 
also potentially be subject to PIPEDA in Canada, in that its search results 
that contain personal information would similarly not meet the criteria 
for either of these exemptions, though the OPC has not yet taken this 
stance.66
64. Ibid at para 68.
65. Ibid at para 78.
66. In Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, the Supreme Court of Canada 
upheld an interlocutory injunction of worldwide reach against Google, 
requiring it to de-list the defendant’s websites that sold wares in violation 
of plaintiff’s intellectual property rights. The court rejected Google’s 
claim that such an injunction interferes with freedom of expression and 
international comity, stating that there was no evidence on the record 
that any jurisdiction across the world would view the particular speech 
at issue as protected speech (that is, speech aiming to pass off the wares 
of the plaintiff as the defendant’s). Google could apply for a variance if it 
was able to prove that protected speech was at issue. The case suggests that 
where there is variance between jurisdictions, that de-listing should be 
limited geographically to those jurisdictions where de-listing is considered 
a justified restriction on freedom of expression. See Google Inc v Equustek 
Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 at paras 46–48. 
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IV. Businesses that Facilitate and Package User-
Generated Content
The second major category of material that is to varying degrees public, 
or more accurately publicly accessible, is user-generated content. This 
may appear on social networking platforms or through websites serving 
as a forum for user-posted material. Indeed, Google reports that most of 
the top 10 sites for which it receives de-listing requests after the CJEU 
ruling are sites that host user-provided content.67 The regulation of sites 
and services that host user-posted content has been controversial, given 
the widely recognized policy of immunizing hosts from liability for third-
party-provided content. The degree of immunity varies by jurisdiction; 
the EU provides hosts immunity from liability for user-posted content 
but revokes that immunity if the host does not respond promptly to 
notice of illegal content, whereas the US provides broad immunity 
through the Communications Decency Act68 (“CDA”), section 230, which 
imposes no obligation on hosts to respond to complaints about user-
posted material. Whether general information location services like 
Google could (or should) be considered mere hosts or intermediaries of 
third-party content that turn up in search results, and hence be wholly or 
partially sheltered from liability, is an open question and would likely be 
answered differently by the US and EU, with Canada undecided.69
The US has struggled with host immunity in its efforts to curtail 
businesses that specifically profit from user-generated content in the 
category of non-consensual pornography (“revenge porn”) — that is, sites 
that encourage users to post intimate images for public consumption 
67. Google Transparency Report, supra note 12. The top 10 sites include 
social media juggernauts Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram (last 
visited on 5 June 2017). 
68. EC, Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), [2000] OJ L 178/1, art 14, 
online: EUR-Lex <eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/31/oj> [Directive 
2000/31/EC]; Communications Decency Act, 47 USC § 230 [CDA], is the 
common name for Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
69. Slane, “Squaring the Remedy”, supra note 5. 
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without the consent of the person pictured. While many jurisdictions 
have now created criminal offences that prohibit posting such images 
without consent, for the most part these offences do not apply to the host 
or platform that houses them or else are not enforced against such hosts.70 
In the US, with the exception of host sites whose operators have been 
found guilty of other offences (e.g. hacking, identity theft, or extortion), 
the operators of online businesses that exploit the criminal acts of users 
have so far generally been assumed to be sheltered by CDA, section 230.71
To date, only one site has been investigated and ruled against by the 
FTC, which found that defendant Craig Brittain, who operated the site 
IsAnybodyDown, had: 
[u]nfairly disseminated photographs of individuals with their intimate parts 
exposed, along with personal information about them, for commercial gain and 
without the knowledge or consent of those depicted, despite the fact that he 
knew or should have known that the individuals had a reasonable expectation 
that their image would not be disseminated in that manner.72 
What the FTC means by “in that manner” is dissemination on commercial 
or for-profit pornography websites, ordering that Brittain must remove 
all photos for which he did not have proof of consent and going forward, 
he must secure proof of consent of the person pictured before allowing a 
user to post that person’s intimate image.73 
Brittain, like the website operators convicted of criminal offences, 
also engaged in further unfair and deceptive business practices, such as 
tricking women into sending him intimate photos by posing as another 
woman on Craigslist, operating a “bounty system” to facilitate posting of 
specific people’s images, and a fee-for-removal model. Nonetheless, the 
70. Andrea Slane & Ganaele Langlois, “Debunking the Myth of Not My Bad: 
Sexual Images, Consent, and Online Host Responsibilities in Canada” 
(2018) 30:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 42 [Slane & 
Langlois, “Debunking the Myth”].
71. CDA, supra note 68.
72. US, Federal Trade Commission, Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to 
Aid Public Comment: In the Matter of Craig Brittain, File No 132 3120, 
(FTC, 29 January 2015), online: FTC <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/150129craigbrittainanalysis.pdf>. 
73. Slane & Langlois, “Debunking the Myth”, supra note 70.
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FTC includes the more common and not as obviously unfair practice of 
soliciting users to post intimate images of other people without ensuring 
consent in its list of unfair business practices.74 However, this kind of 
practice continued to be used by other non-consensual pornography sites, 
despite the FTC ruling against Brittain. For example, the still-operational 
website MyEx.com, operational until January 2018 when it went offline 
as part of a settlement with the FTC, invited users to post images of their 
former lovers, along with identifying information, and disavowed any 
obligation to ensure users had the photo subject’s consent. MyEx.com 
monetized traffic to and from the site in various ways: in addition to the 
general Google Analytics tracking tool, MyEx.com employed Advertising.
com (a tracker that matches ads with the content and types of users of a 
website), EroAdvertising (a more specialized targeted advertising tracker 
for porn-related advertising), and Adult Webmaster Empire (an affiliate 
program, whereby websites like MyEx.com are compensated for driving 
traffic onto a range of other commercial porn websites).75
In the US, websites like MyEx.com, like other websites that 
host third-party content, have assumed they are immune from any 
responsibility regarding material posted by users, under section 230 of 
the CDA. However, this immunity is based on the assumption that such 
websites are not serving as data controllers that process the personal 
information of consumers (albeit non-users of the service) when they 
provide a specific hosting service like this one. Following Google Spain, 
it is clear that the EU takes a different approach, considering business 
models to be processing personal information even when they are simply 
compiling and packaging information posted by others.76 The EU data 
protection requirements are supplemented by the conditional immunity 
74. US, Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Craig Brittain: Complaint 
(C-4564) (2016) at para 5.
75. Ganaele Langlois & Andrea Slane, “Economies of Reputation: The Case of 
Revenge Porn” (2017) 14:2 Communication & Critical/Cultural Studies 
120; US Federal Trade Commission and State of Nevada v EMP Media 
Inc, et al, Stipulated Order for Permanent Injuction on Monetary (2018) 
2:18-cv-00035 at 5-6.  
76. Google Spain, supra note 2 at para 29.
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provided to hosts by the EU E-Commerce Directive, which requires 
businesses to take down illegal material posted by third parties upon 
notification.77 It is unlikely that a non-consensual pornography business 
would be able to comply with data protection requirements in the EU at 
all, but at the very least this kind of business would be required to take 
non-consensually posted intimate material down without charging a fee.
Canada has not formally applied its private-sector data protection 
regime to non-consensual pornography-hosting websites, although the 
OPC does claim to have successfully advocated on behalf of complainants 
to have images taken down.78 In other online contexts, the OPC has 
several times imposed data protection obligations on a service provider 
that allows users to post or otherwise offer up a non-user’s personal 
information; for example, in 2009, the OPC found Facebook to have 
violated PIPEDA with regard to a feature that prompted users to provide 
the email addresses of people they know who were not yet users of 
Facebook.79 The OPC found that there should be “[a] clear distinction 
between activities conducted by Facebook users for strictly personal 
reasons and activities in which Facebook itself is involved”.80 To illustrate, 
the OPC continued:
[w]hen users post information about non-users to their profiles, Walls, or News 
Feeds, such postings are made for personal purposes and as such fall outside the 
purview of the Act. The Act would apply only where Facebook uses non-users’ 
77. Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 68. 
78. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Online Reputation: 
What are they saying about me?” (Ottawa: OPC, 21 January 2016), 
online: OPC <priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-
privacy-research/2016/or_201601/> [OPC, “Online Reputation”].
79. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Report of Findings into the 
Complaint Filed by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic 
(CIPIC) Against Facebook Inc Under the Personal Information Protection 
and Electronic Documents Act, by Elizabeth Denham, PIPEDA Report of 
Findings #2009-008 (Ottawa: OPC, 16 July 2009) [Denham]. See also 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Facebook investigation 
follow-up complete” (Ottawa: OPC, 22 September 2010), online: OPC 
<priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-announcements/2010/bg_100922/>. 
80. Denham, ibid at para 306.
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personal information for purposes of its own.81 
Determination of when a business is using non-user personal information 
“for purposes of its own” within a business model based on advertising, 
traffic direction, and close ties to information removal services also varies 
by jurisdiction; Canada must choose between the approaches used in the 
EU and the US. The business model of non-consensual pornography 
websites — i.e. solicitation and monetization of sensitive personal 
information of non-users — should count as using personal information 
for the business’s own purposes. By this logic, the OPC could also 
consider, as the CJEU did, that search engines like Google specifically 
profit from search results, although profiting from search of a person’s 
name is less clear.
What is clear is that the OPC considers indexing by search engines to 
increase the effects of privacy concerns about information posted online, 
whether that information is public documents as in the Globe24h case 
described above, or is posted by users. In a 2012 finding against the 
Canadian youth-oriented social networking site, Nexopia, the OPC 
found that allowing user profiles and all their contents to be indexed 
by search engines as a default setting was not within the scope of what 
a reasonable person would expect from a social networking site, even 
if, as Nexopia argued, it markets itself as a more outward-facing, public 
exposure-oriented alternative to Facebook.82 The OPC recommended 
that “visible to friends” should be the default privacy setting, and to 
make it obvious and explicit that choosing “visible to all” would include 
indexing via external search engines.83
While the EU, the US, and Canada clearly use different approaches, 
all three jurisdictions distinguish between businesses that merely host 
third-party content, and businesses that assist in creating content that 
uses personal information of users or non-users as part of its profit-
81. Ibid.
82. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Social networking site 
for youth, Nexopia, breached Canadian privacy law, PIPEDA Report of 
Findings #2012-001 (Ottawa: OPC, 18 February 2013) at para 71.
83. Ibid at para 107.
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making activity.84 In response to public pressure to curtail the effects of 
non-consensual pornography businesses on victims, many mainstream 
US-based companies have voluntarily chosen to make it easier for these 
data subjects to successfully request removal of intimate images they did 
not consent to have publicly posted, including Reddit, Facebook, Twitter, 
Microsoft, and Google.85 Facebook recently announced it would employ 
a photo identification system to block the reposting of such images it 
84. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommates.com, LLC, 521 
F (3d) 1157 (9th Cir 2008) (US); Mary Anne Franks, “The Lawless 
Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 230”, Huff Post 
(blog) (18 December 2013), online: Huffington Post <huffingtonpost.
com/mary-anne-franks/section-230-the-lawless-internet_b_4455090.
html>. 
85. All of these services announced new policies in 2015 regarding take-
down of intimate images housed on their services upon complaint by 
the victim. Andrea Peterson, “Reddit is finally cracking down on revenge 
porn” The Washington Post (24 February 2015), online: Washington Post 
<washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/02/24/reddit-is-finally-
cracking-down-on-revenge-porn/?utm_term=.df3926415b93>; Hayley 
Tsukayama, “Twitter updates its rules to specifically ban ‘revenge porn’” 
The Washington Post (11 March 2015), online: Washington Post <www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/03/11/twitter-updates-
its-rules-to-specifically-ban-revenge-porn/?utm_term=.46ee8ea4384f>; 
Vindu Goel, “Facebook Clarifies Rules on What It Bans and Why” 
New York Times: Bits (blog) (16 March 2015), online: NY Times <bits.
blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/16/facebook-explains-what-it-bans-
and-why/?mcubz=0>; Alyssa Newcomb, “How Microsoft Is Waging 
War Against Revenge Porn” ABC News (23 July 2015), online: ABC 
<abcnews.go.com/Technology/microsoft-waging-war-revenge-porn/
story?id=32639751>; Jeff John Roberts, “Google to remove ‘revenge 
porn’ links at victims’ request” Fortune (19 June 2015), online: Fortune 
<fortune.com/2015/06/19/google-revenge-porn-removal/>. 
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had already taken down.86 In the US, these are voluntary policies and 
are limited to non-consensual pornography, nonetheless these voluntary 
policies are efforts to distinguish ethical platforms from unethical ones, 
where the former engage in striking a normatively fair balance between 
their incentives to make information easily accessible and the interests of 
people whose personal information is circulating.  
Harnessing privacy invasion for profit via the attention economy 
drives many online business models. If this economy is to be fair, then an 
appropriate balance is needed between competing stakeholder interests, a 
balance that considers the sensitivity of the information (often correlated 
with harm or risk of harm to the data subject), and the public interest in 
easy access to that information. 
V. Viral Content: When Online Personal 
Information Becomes Part of Public Culture 
The public interest in access to content that includes the personal 
information of others is malleable, especially in an online context 
where viral distribution of some online material may render it a part of 
public culture. However, here too balancing of interests — by way of an 
analysis akin to newsworthiness — can help determine whether virality 
is sufficient to justify ongoing easy access to that content.
In the attention economy, the “subculture of humiliation” ensures 
86. Matt Burgess, “Facebook is using photo-matching to tackle ‘revenge 
porn’” Wired (6 April 2017), online: Wired <wired.co.uk/article/
facebook-revenge-porn-tools>. In the Facebook Moderation Guidelines 
leaked to the press in May 2017, the internal Facebook document stated 
that Facebook had flagged more than 50,000 posts as related to non-
consensual intimate imagery and sextortion in the month of January 2017 
alone. The guidelines set out an escalation and removal protocol. See 
Nick Hopkins, “Revealed: Facebook’s internal rulebook on sex, terrorism 
and violence” The Guardian (21 May 2017), online: The Guardian 
<www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-
rulebook-sex-terrorism-violence>; see especially “What Facebook says 
on sextortion and revenge porn” The Guardian (22 May 2017), online: 
The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/22/what-
facebook-says-on-sextortion-and-revenge-porn>. 
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that public circulation of sensitive personal information can be especially 
profitable for online businesses. For example, consider materials that 
mock or otherwise harass a person with disabilities. One of the earliest 
and most controversial cases of this sort involved an Italian court’s 
conviction of three Google executives for criminal privacy invasion in 
2010, charges that arose from users posting a video of an autistic boy 
being physically bullied to Google Video (its video-sharing platform 
prior to its purchase of YouTube).87 The decision was widely criticized as 
misconstruing service provider obligations both in the US and in Europe, 
and the decision was overturned by an Italian appellate court in 2012. 
The Court of Appeals found that Google served as a host and had no 
obligation to monitor user postings, and had responded promptly by 
removing the video once expressly notified.88
While not discussed in the case, had Google not removed the video 
upon being notified, it likely would have been liable for the criminal 
offences charged, and also subject to data protection obligations related 
to the sensitive personal information of the autistic boy pictured in the 
video. Following Google Spain, Google would have been found to be a 
“data controller” profiting from the exploitation of this video; in the two 
months in which it was publicly available, Google Video algorithms had 
ranked the video highly in the “funny video” category and the Google 
AdWords service had automatically associated specific search terms with 
the video.89 In other words, Google collected profits from the public 
87. Manuela D’Alessandro, “Google executives convicted for Italy autism 
video” Reuters (24 February 2010), online: Reuters <www.reuters.com/
article/us-italy-google-conviction-idUSTRE61N2G520100224>; Ernesto 
Apa & Oreste Pollicino, Modeling the Liability of Internet Service Providers: 
Google vs Vivi Down, A Constitutional Perspective (Milan: Egea, 2013). 
88. “Court of appeals overturns conviction of Google Italy executives, 
redefines liability of hosting providers under privacy legislation” Lexology 
(26 March 2013), online: Lexology <www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=b36ffdc4-ee2b-4dfb-ae83-01bcb15ff5f7>. 
89. Bruno Carotti, “The Google — Vivi Down Case: Providers’ Responsibility, 
Privacy and Internet Freedom” in Sabino Cassese et al, eds, Global 
Administrative Law: The Casebook (Institute for Research on Public 
Administration, 2012) 117. 
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availability and popularity of this video via an advertising model that 
capitalized on people searching for and viewing it.
The new GDPR in the EU would likely further require a hosting 
platform like Google Video to remove the video on request as part of 
the “right to be forgotten”. The US consumer protection regime surely 
would not, because Google had no hand in creating or posting the video, 
nor did it specifically solicit this type of content, unlike the common 
practice on non-consensual pornography sites. The voluntary moderation 
guidelines leaked from Facebook in 2017 also reveal that photos mocking 
people with disabilities have until recently not been considered the 
kind of material that should be removed (the Facebook guidelines even 
included an image of a person with Down Syndrome as an example).90 
In other words, mocking people with disabilities is deemed a matter of 
freedom of speech, offensive but protected, although it is unclear in the 
guidelines and the discussion of them whether a request from the person 
pictured (or his or her guardian) would prompt a different action from 
Facebook than a general user’s complaint about an objectionable image 
of an unknown person with disabilities.91
Identification is an aggravating factor in privacy invasion, and an 
online image of an identifiable person (e.g. showing a face) becomes 
something else entirely when that image is associated with a name. Images 
of an identifiable person may still contain sensitive personal information 
90. Nick Hopkins, “Revealed: Facebook’s internal rulebook on sex, terrorism 
and violence” The Guardian (21 May 2017), online: The Guardian 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-
internal-rulebook-sex-terrorism-violence>; Julia Angwin & Hannes 
Grassegger, “Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men From 
Hate Speech But Not Black Children” ProPublica (28 June 2017), online: 
ProPublica <https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-hate-speech-
censorship-internal-documents-algorithms>.
91. Nick Hopkins, “How Facebook allows users to post footage of children 
being bullied: Leaked guidelines on cruel and abusive posts also show 
how company judges who ‘deserves our protection’ and who doesn’t” 
The Guardian (22 May 2017), online: The Guardian <https://www.
theguardian.com/news/2017/may/22/how-facebook-allows-users-to-post-
footage-of-children-being-bullied>.
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(as with the autistic boy), but if the image is publicly associated with 
the name of a specific person, the degree of invasiveness is magnified. 
This distinction was described by Ghyslain Raza, a then 14-year-old boy 
who gained unwanted internet fame as the “Star Wars Kid” beginning in 
2003, when a video he privately recorded of himself wielding a pretend 
lightsaber was found and posted by mocking classmates. He noted that 
it was only when his name was released by a media organization that the 
harassment became much worse, opening him up not only to bullying 
by people he already knew offline (his schoolmates) but also to random 
unknown individuals online.92 So while many people have argued that 
the “Star Wars Kid” video entered public culture, along with its many 
benign user-generated variations, it is much more difficult to argue that 
the video and its variations should continue to be associated with Raza’s 
name.93
This brings us back to the issue of name search results in search 
engines, and the way that Google, after the Google Spain decision, now 
distinguishes between requests to delist news articles that are, or are not, 
associated with a person. Even the newsworthiness of an article published 
by a dedicated news site wanes as time goes on if the individual named 
therein is no longer in the public eye.94 Google lists 23 examples of news 
articles that were requested to be delisted and the decision it made in 
relation to each; in the 11 examples where Google granted the delisting, 
most dealt with articles referring to minor crimes, quashed convictions, 
92. Rebecca Hawkes, “Whatever happened to Star Wars Kid? The sad 
but inspiring story behind one of the first victims of cyberbullying” 
The Telegraph (4 May 2016), online: The Telegraph <telegraph.co.uk/
films/2016/05/04/whatever-happened-to-star-wars-kid-the-true-story-
behind-one-of/>; Jonathan Trudel, “Return of the ‘Star Wars Kid’”, 
Maclean’s (27 May 2013) 28.
93. Meg Leta Ambrose, “You Are What Google Says You Are: The Right to 
be Forgotten and Information Stewardship” (2012) 17:07 International 
Review of Information Ethics 21; Limor Shifman, “An anatomy of a 
YouTube meme” (2012) 14:2 New Media & Society 187.
94. Meg Leta Ambrose, “It’s About Time: Privacy, Information Life Cycles, 
and the Right to Be Forgotten” (2013) 16:2 Stanford Technology Law 
Review 369.
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crime victims or relatives of crime victims who were not public figures, as 
well as an article naming a contestant in a contest who was a minor at the 
time.95 Of the 12 examples where delisting was not granted, most involved 
crimes by public officials, serious crimes, serious accusations regarding 
people in positions of trust, professional misconduct/discipline, fraud, 
and one example of a “media professional” requesting removal of links 
to articles reporting on embarrassing content he had posted himself.96 
Together, these examples show that Google has attempted to establish 
guidelines regarding what sort of personal information contained in news 
stories remains in the public interest enough to warrant ongoing public 
association with a person’s name, and what does not. 
While internet service providers, including Google, have not yet had 
to deal with the stronger right of erasure in the new GDPR, the key will be 
proportionality in balancing the public interest in access to information 
that has entered into public circulation against the ongoing privacy 
interests of the individuals named or otherwise identified. In some cases, 
an image — like the “Star Wars Kid” video — might acquire the status of a 
shared cultural document, the factual content of which is not particularly 
sensitive. In most others, determining whether delisting or deindexing is 
the most appropriate way to address the privacy interest of the subject 
will depend on both the degree of sensitivity of the information revealed 
(a child’s autism-related reaction to physical confrontation is clearly more 
sensitive than a child’s goofy playacting) and the degree to which the 
document in which the information appears has acquired or maintained 
newsworthiness (as distinguished from prurient or morbid curiosity)97 or 
the public culture equivalent thereof. Widespread creative adaptation of 
a popular culture meme weighs in favour of keeping the Star Wars Kid 
video available, although it should be disassociated from the young man’s 
95. California passed a bill providing a means for minors to remove material 
they have posted themselves. See US, SB 568, An Act to Add Chapter 
22.1 (Commencing with Section 22580) to Division 8 of the Business and 
Professions Code, Relating to the Internet, 2013–14, Reg Sess, Cal, 2015 
(enacted).  
96. Google Transparency Report, supra note 12.
97. Worley, supra note 13.
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name unless he chooses otherwise, while mean-spirited humour found in 
the humiliation of a person with disabilities does not.
VI. Publicly Available ≠ Free for the Taking 
Policies regarding how and whether to constrain businesses that profit 
from access to publicly available documents on the public internet have 
implications for how to regulate “big data”, another front on which 
the privacy interests of data subjects may clash with business interests 
in monetizing publicly accessible information. These same authorities 
are beginning to question the idea that, although people leave behind a 
trail of information wherever they go and whatever they do online, this 
information is free for the taking. However, as with publicly accessible 
information packaged for open public consumption by information 
location services, to date regulators have only targeted the most egregious 
business practices.
For example, the FTC’s 2015 decision and order against the 
website, Jerk.com, found the site operators to be engaging in unfair and 
deceptive business practices related to harvesting profile content from 
Facebook via an application program interface (“API”) that allowed 
third-party application developers to access even content that was set 
to be shared only with “friends”.98 The operators of Jerk.com claimed 
that their content was created by their users, when in fact it was largely 
created by the operators themselves, from personal information scraped 
from Facebook and other “publicly accessible” sources, many of which 
contained full names and images, buttons for users to vote whether or not 
the person was a “jerk”, and fields for users to fill in further information 
about that person.99 These profiles were then made available for indexing 
by general search engines.100 Jerk.com’s business model included selling 
USD $30 memberships, requiring a USD $25 “customer service fee” to 
98. US, Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Jerk, LLC and John 
Fanning: Complaint (No. 9361) (2014) at paras 7, 10–11 [Jerk.com 
Complaint].   
99. US, Federal Trade Commission, In the Matter of Jerk, LLC and John 
Fanning: Opinion (No. 9361) (2015).
100. Jerk.com Complaint, supra note 98 at para 9.
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communicate with administrators, and third-party advertising.101
The Respondents claimed that their enterprise amounted to speech 
protected by the First Amendment because the Facebook photos and 
profile information were “publicly available” and that Facebook was to 
blame for making that material accessible. In other words, once Facebook 
failed to ensure that its users’ private information was protected, any 
developer could use that information however they chose.102 Indeed the 
Respondent tried to argue that the First Amendment was implicated 
because the FTC’s order impinges on “[j]erk.com posting publicly 
available information derived from the internet”.103 The FTC (and the 
US Court of Appeal that upheld its decision) rejected that claim, in 
essence finding that Jerk.com misrepresented the source of its profile 
content, thereby misleading consumers as to how it had obtained it.104 
The ruling is narrow, in that it does not directly deal with the problem 
of whether a business that exploits a technological weakness that renders 
personal information publicly accessible gains the right to process or 
package it in whatever way it pleases, provided that they are honest with 
consumers about the source.105 It is unclear, then, whether the First 
Amendment would protect the right to publish personal information 
scraped from the internet via a security weakness, given the seminal 1989 
US Supreme Court freedom of speech decision in Florida Star v BJF,106 
where a newspaper was permitted to defy restrictions on publicizing a 
rape victim’s identity because police had been negligent in including her 
name in a police report. In that case, the onus on protecting sensitive 
personal information was placed entirely on the public authority that 
improperly released it; the distinction with the Jerk.com case could 
101. Ibid at para 5.
102. Trial Brief of Respondent John Fanning in Fanning v Federal Trade 
Commission (No 15-1520) (2016) at 3, stating “nothing prohibited the 
publication on jerk.com information made accessible to the public by 
Facebook through the internet”. 
103. Ibid.
104. Jerk.com Complaint, supra note 98 at para 10.
105. US, Federal Trade Commission, Fanning v Federal Trade Commission (No 
15-1520) (2016).
106. Florida Star, supra note 49.
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come down to the difference between newsworthy material held by a 
public entity that media organizations utilized precisely as news upon 
its improper public release, versus private, non-newsworthy material 
that is improperly accessible and that has been utilized for a commercial 
purpose devoid of public interest. 
In Canada, the OPC has made stronger statements about 
inappropriate exploitation of public access to personal information when 
it conducted an investigation into Google’s data collection practices for its 
location-based services (Google Maps), where Google was discovered to 
have collected a significant amount of “payload data” from unencrypted 
WiFi networks in the course of the data-gathering operations of its Street 
View cars.107 These data included the full names, telephone numbers, and 
addresses of many Canadians, as well as complete email messages, email 
headers, IP addresses, machine hostnames, and the contents of cookies, 
instant messages, and chat sessions.108 While Google claimed that the data 
collection was inadvertent, the OPC nonetheless took the opportunity to 
stress that even if a WiFi network is unencrypted and therefore publicly 
accessible, that does not mean any private data travelling across that 
network are free for the taking: 
[n]otwithstanding the fact the personal information collected was sourced from 
unprotected networks (and was in some cases fragmented), it is impossible 
to conceive that a reasonable person would have considered such collection 
appropriate in the circumstances.109 
What a reasonable person considers appropriate in the circumstances is 
the formula for determining commercial fairness in handling personal 
information set out in PIPEDA.110 Further, Canadian constitutional 
protection for freedom of expression allows more restrictions regarding 
publication of sensitive personal information held by public authorities, 
even if it is “newsworthy” in the way that is understood in the US. The 
107. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Google Inc WiFi Data 
Collection, PIPEDA Report of Findings #2011-001 (Ottawa: OPC, 6 June 
2011). 
108. Ibid at para 17.
109. Ibid at paras 18, 21. 
110. PIPEDA, supra note 14, ss 3, 5.
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names of sexual assault victims, for instance, are routinely made subject 
to publication bans, even though their names are available to the public 
via court proceedings.111 In other words, Canada does not place the onus 
only on data custodians to keep personal information from the public. 
Instead, Canada has mechanisms in place to impose obligations on 
publishers who have had access to that information where the sensitivity 
of the information warrants it, viewing such restrictions as justified in a 
free and democratic society: in other words, a fair restriction in grander 
terms.112
Many privacy scholars have expressed grave concerns about the ways 
that businesses are exploiting publicly accessible personal information, 
especially considering how little information these businesses make 
available about exactly how their information collection and packaging 
algorithms function.113 Julie Cohen coined the term “biopolitical public 
domain”, referring to the popular idea that all data are fair game and 
can be collected freely, which she sees as employing a skewed sense of 
the concept of “public domain” that operates in a more well-developed 
fashion in intellectual property law.114 She argued that we need to develop 
a more robust notion of what belongs in the “data commons” with regard 
to the practices of information aggregators and processors, so as to better 
protect personal information even in the realm of publicly accessible raw 
or de-identified data.115
111. Criminal Code, RSC, 1985, c C-46, s 486.4.
112. Canadian Newspapers Co v Canada (AG), [1988] 2 SCR 122.
113. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control 
Money and Information (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); 
Tauel Harper, “The big data public and its problems: Big Data and the 
structural transformation of the public sphere” (2017) 19:9 New Media & 
Society 1424.  
114. Julie Cohen, “The Biopolitical Public Domain: the Legal 
Construction of the Surveillance Economy” (2017) Philosophy 
& Technology 1, online: Springer <link.springer.com/content/
pdf/10.1007%2Fs13347-017-0258-2.pdf>.
115. Ibid at 12. 
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VII. Conclusion: Data Privacy in “Public”
Privacy scholars have begun to explore the various ways that publicly 
accessible information is being collected and used, both by public 
and private entities.116 Unfair handling of publicly accessible personal 
information has a particularly potent adverse affect on historically or 
situationally vulnerable populations, further amplifying the urgency of 
a fairness-based approach to businesses that deal in such information. 
Public records that are easily accessible have the potential to be 
misused, disproportionally affecting the reputations and corresponding 
opportunities of members of historically marginalized groups, such 
as economically disadvantaged persons and historically persecuted 
ethnic minorities, as well as individuals who are vulnerable as a result 
of adverse life events. User-generated content is also more likely to 
disproportionately affect historically marginalized groups online, mainly 
due to the “subculture of humiliation” where users post derogatory, 
harassing information, often about disempowered groups (women, 
the poor, ethnic minorities, and persons with disabilities).117 As Frank 
Pasquale wrote: 
[n]ew threats to reputation have seriously undermined the efficacy of health 
116. Chris Jay Hoofnagle, “Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and 
Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law 
Enforcement” (2003) 29:4 North Carolina Journal of International Law 
& Commercial Regulation 595; Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, “Critical 
Questions For Big Data” (2012) 15:5 Information, Communication & 
Society 662; Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, “Big Data and Due Process: 
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms” (2014) 55:1 
Boston College Law Review 93 at 101; Levin, supra note 29; Amy Conroy 
& Teresa Scassa, “Promoting Transparency While Protecting Privacy in 
Open Government in Canada” (2015) 53:1 Alberta Law Review 175; 
Ramona Pringle, “‘Data is the new oil’: Your personal information is now 
the world’s most valuable commodity” CBC News (25 August 2017), 
online: CBC <cbc.ca/news/technology/data-is-the-new-oil-1.4259677>. 
117. OPC, “Online Reputation”, supra note 78, citing Nicolaus Mills, 
“Television and the Politics of Humiliation” (2004) 51:3 Dissent 79 at 79; 
Emily B Laidlaw, “Online Shaming and the Right to Privacy” (2017) 6:1 
Laws 1. 
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privacy law, credit reporting, and expungement. The common thread is 
automated, algorithmic arrangements of information, which could render 
a data point removed or obscured in one records system, and highly visible 
or dominant in other, more important ones … [it] is not much good for an 
ex-convict to expunge his juvenile record, if the fact of his conviction is the 
top Google result for searches on his name for the rest of his life. Nor is the 
removal of a bankruptcy judgment from a credit report of much use to an 
individual if it influences lead generators’ or social networks’ assessments of 
creditworthiness, and would-be lenders are in some way privy to those or 
similar reputational reports.118
However, some scholars do not draw a parallel between business use 
of publicly accessible information and the kind of activities that search 
engines or other information location and packaging services do. For 
example, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog noted that “[m]ost people 
are vastly less powerful than the government and corporate institutions 
that create and control digital technologies and the personal data on 
which those technologies run”.119 However both see the EU’s “right to be 
forgotten” as a serious threat to online freedom of expression and access 
to information, which could create “[a]n internet that could be edited 
like Wikipedia by individuals who do not like the facts reported about 
them in newspapers”.120
Freedom of expression remains an important component to 
determining when the privacy interests of data subjects should or should 
not prevail over public interest in access to an individual’s personal 
information, whether commercial or not. But it is worth remembering 
that Google is a huge and diverse company, and that while Google Spain 
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1183.
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2015) at 90–92; Woodrow Hartzog, “A Stronger ‘Online Eraser’ Law 
Would Be a Mistake” New Scientist (6 November 2013), online: New 
Scientist <newscientist.com/article/mg22029420-200-a-stronger-online-
eraser-law-would-be-a-mistake>.  
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is a decision that only affects its public search engine business, its parent 
company, Alphabet, is rapidly diversifying in a way that will make it 
increasingly difficult to separate out revenue derived from advertising 
linked to search results and revenue derived from data analytics more 
generally (e.g. connections between AdWords, AdSense, and YouTube, 
Google Maps, Gmail, Google Drive, and Google Play). What we decide 
to do in terms of characterizing information location and packaging 
services as either first and foremost business ventures, or as guardians 
of publicly available information, will affect regulations about the big 
data analytics industry and privacy going forward. Algorithms and other 
forms of machine learning and processing have inherent errors and biases. 
Therefore, imposing data protection obligations on businesses that use 
them to collect and package publicly accessible personal information 
can serve as a useful, if limited, means of addressing one variant of the 
machinations of informational power online. 
Overall, however, all personal data collection, processing and 
packaging should be subject to an analysis rooted in fairness, regardless of 
whether that information is publicly accessible. That is, fairness requires an 
appropriate balance between competing interests, where the sensitivity of 
the information must be taken into account, including disproportionate 
impact on vulnerable populations, in order to determine what is a fair 
business practice in the ever-changing information marketplace.
